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ELECTRONIC BILLBOARDS ALONG THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY:
LIABILITY UNDER THE LANHAM ACT FOR
USING TRADEMARKS TO KEY INTERNET
BANNER ADS
CHRISTINE D. GALBRAMI*
Abstract: With almost one billion web pages on the Internet today, a
search engine is a necessity at times. But search engines are also for-
profit ventures and the financial success of these sites hinges on
advertising revenue. One of the ways in which these sites generate
income is by selling "keywords" to advertisers. Although there has been
only one judicial decision—Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Commun-
ications—involving banner ads keyed to trademarks, it will undoubtedly
not be the last. This Article argues that despite the invisible nature of
this unauthorized trademark use, the common practice of keying a
banner ad to another's trademark is a potential violation of the Lanham
Act, giving rise to claims for trademark infringement, false designation
of origin and trademark
INTRODUCTION
You power up your computer.
You sign on to your Internet server.
You are ready to take a cruise down the information superhigh-
way.
You need a present for your mother's birthday, but you've de-
cided you don't want to actually venture out into the non-digital world
to find it. After considering your options you determine flowers are
your best bet, so you start "surfing" the Internet for a florist. You try a
few different routes to help you locate the information you want. You
quickly realize, however, that you don't have clear directions to help
you navigate the web sites. So before getting completely lost you de-
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; 13.5. Uni-
versity of Illinois, 1992J.1), University of Illinois, 1995.
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title to pull over and onto your favorite search engine' to get direc-
tions.
You put in the term "FTD," as you suddenly remember that this is
the name of the company that helped you send flowers last year.
Within seconds, the search engine gives you a list of "relevant" web
sites. At the very top of the list you also get an ad for The Teleflorist
Company that instructs you to "click here" to find out more informa-
tion on "The best network of florists in the nation." Coincidence you
wonder? You point your cursor onto the designated spot and immedi-
ately you are transported to the Teleflorist Company's home page.
Being a curious and intellectual type of person you pop onto an-
other search engine site and again put in the term "FTD." This time
you get a list of "relevant" sites, as well as an ad at the top of the list
for Joe's Flower Shop (which it turns out is not part of the Florist
Transworld Delivery network). This advertisement requests that you
"click here" for more information on "Great flowers at a great price
from Joe's Flower Shop." With your curiosity yet to be satisfied, you try
another search engine.
This time, you are given yet another list of "relevant" sites and an
ad at the top for "Suzanne's House of Diamonds" requesting that you
"click here," and asking "Why would you want to send flowers that last
a week when you could send a diamond that lasts a lifetime?" Whether
or not you really want to know the answer to that question, you are
left with a query of your own. Why is it that every time you type in the
term "FTD" advertisements appear that somehow seem related to
your search request?
Welcome to the world of search engine "keyed" banner ads. With
almost one billion web pages on the Internet today, 2 a search engine
is a necessity at times. Search engines like Excite, 3 AltaVista,4 and Net-
I A search engine is:
a special kind of website containing a database of other known websites, asso-
ciating certain keywords with each website. The user provides the search en-
gine with terms of interest to the user, and the search engine responds with a
list of websites on its database associated with the terms submitted by the user.
Nettis Elm'. Ltd. v. !WI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1999); see Win Part
IL
2 See Cyvelliance, Slate of the Internet (visited July 21, 1999) Chttp://www.cyveillance.
com/about/stateint.html>. The number of Web pages went from 250,000 in 1996 to al-
most I billion pages today. See id. Reports indicate that the number of Web pages is dou-
bling every 100 days. See id.
3 Excite! (visited Aug. 15, 2000) Chttp://www.excite.com >.
AltaVista (visited Aug. 15, 2000) Clutp://wwwaltavista.com >.
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scape5 can direct Internet users more efficiently to the websites that
contain the information they seek or the services they desire. But
search engines are also for-profit ventures and the financial success of
these sites hinges on advertising revenue. One of the ways in which
these sites generate income is by selling "keywords" to advertisers.
When a particular word is entered as a search term, an ad for the
company purchasing the keyword is displayed as a banner above the
search results. Such keyword ad sales enable search engines to offer
advertisers access to users according to their interests 6
 and charge a
significant premium over more general advertising purchases thus
making it exceptionally lucrative.?
In 1998, Internet advertising expenditures exceeded 2 billion
dollars,8 surpassing outdoor billboard spending for the first time. 9
That number is expected to increase to more than 15 billion dollars
globally by the end of 2003. 10 Banner ads are the single greatest
source of revenue for Internet search companies." Currently, adver-
tising sales based on keywords account for roughly twenty-five percent
of the advertising revenue generated by these sites. 12
Keyword advertising buys may consist of such generic words as
"car" or . "automobile," but most major search engines also sell trade-
marks such as "FORD" to the automaker's competitors. 13 The ques-
tion becomes whether this common practice of selling banner adver-
tising keyed to someone else's trademark violates the Lanham Act. In
a traditional trademark infringement, false designation of origin or.
dilution action, the alleged infringing use by the defendant is visible.
In the case of a banner ad keyed, to a trademark, however, the unau-
5 Netscape Home Page (visited Aug. 15, 2000) Chttp://netscape.com >.
6 See Greg Miller & Davan Maharaj, Banner Ads on the Web Spark a Trademark Battle Inter ,
net: Two leading portal sites are targets of lawsuits over their marketing of keywords, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1999, at Al.
I See Nelson Wang, Lawsuits Challenge Sales of Keywords to Advertisers, INTERNET WORLD,
Feb. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL 15787660.
See Eileen Mutton, Firms Claim Search Engines Abuse Their Names, MARKETING News,
Mae 15, 1999, at 16.
g See John Buskin, E-Cammerce (A Special Report j: A New Model — Online Persuaders: The one
thing everybody agrees on is this: Vireb advert4ing is different; Novi as to what that means ... ,
WALL ST. J., July 12, 1999, at RI2.
10 See Cyvelliance, supra note 2.
11 See Business DigeSt: Playboy Suit Charges Infringement of Trademarks, BALTIMORE SUN,
Feb. 12, 1999, at 2D.
32 See Wang, supra note 7; Greg Miller & Davan Maharaj, Search-Engine Ads Sully Trade-
marks, Lawsuits Contend, SEATTLE "rIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at Fl.
15 See Laurie J. Flynn, Compressed Data: !Lawsuits Challenge Internet Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1999, at C4.
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thorized use of that mark is embedded in the search engine program.
As such, this trademark usage is never visible to the individual utiliz-
ing a search engine, but it directly impacts what is displayed to the
user upon performing the search. This in turn often causes the user
to visit web sites he or she would not otherwise have viewed.
This Article argues that despite the invisible nature of this unau-
thorized trademark use, the common practice of keying a banner ad
to another's trademark is a potential violation of the Lanham Act, giv-
ing rise to claims for trademark infringement, false designation of
origin and trademark dilution. Part I of this article discusses the tech-
nology behind keyed advertising. Part II examines the elements nec-
essary to make out claims of trademark infringement, false designa-
tion of origin and federal trademark dilution under this statute. In
Part III this article examines metatags, in particular how these terms
embedded in the HTML code of a web site are used and how the re-
ported decisions on using another's trademark in a metatag provide
an analogy for finding liability under the Lanham Act in banner ad
cases. Finally, in Part IV, this article reviews the only reported banner
ad decision to date, analyzing why the court's finding of non-
infringement was incorrect and how banner ad disputes should be
decided in the future.
I. THE INTERNET
In order to appreciate the legal controversy surrounding the un-
authorized use of another's trademark to key a banner ad, it is helpful
to have some background on the relevant technology. The Internet is
a global network of interconnected computers that allows a user to
communicate and share information with other individuals and or-
ganizations." The World Wide Web (the "Web") is a part of the Inter-
net, and consists of a collection of information resources contained in
documents located on individual computers around the world. 15 The
Web is growing at a phenomenal rate and has become an important
mechanism for commerce. 16 As a result, "companies are racing to
stake out their place in cyberspace.""
14 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
15 See id.; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
16
 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 939; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (citing
an estimate that over 200 million people will use the Internet in 1999).
17 Brookfield Coin»tunications, 174 F.3d at 1044.
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Many companies create web sites to provide information about
their organizations, the products or services they offer and as a means
for ordering the described goods or services. These web sites contain
individual web pages that consist of data files written in Hypertext
Markup Language ("HTML"). Each web site has its own domain ad-
dress which is an identifier that is somewhat analogous to a telephone
number or street address. 18 For example, the Nike Athletic Shoe Cor-
poration has a web site at "nike.com " that describes, among other
things, its athletic shoes and apparel, its corporate officers, and con-
tains a searchable list of retail outlets that sell "NIKE" brand prod-
ucts. 19
A domain name has two parts—a second-level domain and a top-
level domain. The second-level domain consists of a term or series of
terms, often a descriptive term, a company's name or a brand-name.
Top-level domains indicate the type of organization that holds that
address and include ".corn" for commercial enterprises, ".edu" for
educational enterprises, ".org" for non-profit and miscellaneous or-
ganizations, ".gov" for government sites, ".net" for networking provid-
ers and ".mil" for military information sites." Much like telephone
numbers, each web site must have its own unique address, as two enti-
ties cannot have the same domain name. For example, there cannot
be two "flowers.corn." If a desired domain name has already been as-
signed to someone else, an entity must select a different one.
Oftentimes one looking for a particular company may know the
company's domain name and go directly to its web site. However, if a
user does not have this information, he or she will need to use a
search engine like Excite," AltaVista,22 or Netscape23 to help locate
the desired site. 24 When a keyword is entered, the search engine sorts
through its self-created index of web sites to find sites that contain the
keyword. Once these sites are identified, the search engine then uses
18
 See id.
19 Nike.com (visited Ang. 14, 2000) Chttp://www.nike.com >.
29 See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1044; Panavision	 Li'. v. Toeppen, 141
/F.3(11316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
21 Excite! (visited Aug. 15, 2000) <http://www.excite.cont >.
22 AltaVista (visited Aug. 15, 2000) <http://wwwahavista.com >.
25 Netscape Home Page (visited Aug. 15, 2000) Chttp://netscapc.com >,
24 "Search engine" is ofien used generically to describe both true search engines and
directorieS. In this article, the term is used in this manner. A true search engine creates its
listings automatically, by using robotic programs that search the web for content. A direc-
tory. on the other hand, depends on humans to compile their listings. See Search Engine
Watch, How Search Engines Work (visited July 21, 1999) <http://www.searchenginewatch.
com/wehmasters/work.html >.
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an algorithm to rank the web sites in terms of relevancy. As each
search engine has its own algorithm to arrange the indexed materials,
the web sites that are listed and the order in which they are listed will
differ depending on the particular search engine used. 25
Search engines look for keywords in places such as domain
names, the actual text of the web page and in metatags. 26 Metatags are
HTML code that the web site programmer uses to describe the con-
tents of a particular web site. There are a number of different types of
metatags, but the two most important types are description metatags
and keyword metatags. A description metatag is supposed to describe
the web site, while a keyword metatag is designed to contain terms
that relate to the contents of the web site. 27 For example, a descrip-
tion metatag for the GAP clothing store web site might state: "Infor-
mation on GAP brand clothing and location of retail outlets, and re-
lated companies," while the keyword metatag might read: "'GAP'
'BABY GAP' 'GAP KIDS"JFANS"SWEATERS"T-SHIRTS"SOCKS'
`OLD NAVY'."
These tags are invisible to the average Internet user, 28 but are
used by search engines to identify and rank web sites. The more often
a term appears in the metatag, the more likely it is that the web page
will appear on the returned list of "hits" to the user. Since the list of
"hits" can number in the thousands, there is an intense pressure to
appear high up on the list of search results . because users rarely look
at more than ten or twenty of the web sites identified as relevant by
the search engine. 29
As a result of this competition, an enormous amount of money is
being spent on software, services and consultants as companies seek
to improve their ranking on the "hit" list generated by a search en-
gine." Unfortunately, countless web sites have also resorted to a range
of deceptive techniques to increase the likelihood that they will ap-
pear at the top of the search results. One such tactic is for an unscru-
25 See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1045; Nicoll Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring
Devices, Inc., 27 F. Stipp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998); Interthatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.
Supp. 1227, 1231-232 (N.D. III. 1996); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
26 See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1045; infra Part IV.
27
 See Brookfield CommunicatiOns, 174 F.3d at 1045.
" These lags can he viewed when using NETSCAPE's browser, for example, by clicking
on the "VIEW SOURCE" command. This allows an Internet user to view a web site's pro-
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pulous web site to include its competitors' trademarks in its metatags.
When a search engine user enters those terms, the unscrupulous web
site will also show up high in the search results. The hope is that as a
result of this deception, a user will visit the desired web site. 31 Once
there, the unscrupulous web site operator hopes the user will view the
content and advertising on its site, and possibly purchase its goods or
services, instead of visiting the site of the company for which the user
was originally searching. 32
• Within this highly competitive arena, search engines are willing
to sell and companies are willing to buy, at top dollar, banner ads
keyed to particular terms. Keyed banner ads are another strategy to
attract users to web sites. To avoid the risk of showing up low or not
appearing on a "hit" list, a purchaser of a keyed banner ad is now able
to assure itself a highly visible position in the search results. Not only
will the company appear on the page of search results returned to the
user, but the company's banner ad will appear prominently above the
first listing on the "hit" list. Furthermore, instead of appearing as
mere text describing the contents of a potentially relevant web site
like the rest of the search results, these electronic billboards often in-
clude vivid graphics, multiple frames and attention-getting messages
designed to convince a search engine user to click onto the ad so that
they are immediately taken to the sponsor's web site.
Driving the push for keyed banner ads is a theory called "inertia
marketing." According to inertia marketing theory, search engine us-
ers will take the first and most convenient route to the solution of
their task." The company with the banner ad flashing at the very top
of the screen will, in theory, be able to lure more customers to its web
site than those companies that merely appear in the list of relevant
web sites returned by the search engine. If the search engines are only
keying these ads to generic words like "car" or "dog," then keyed ban-
ner ads are possibly just a good marketing strategy by the search en-
gines and smart use of advertising dollars by the companies purchas-
ing this premium form of advertising. When the search engine sells a
banner ad keyed to someone else's trademark, however, it is using
that company's brand name to redirect search engine users and mak-
ing a healthy profit off of it. The question then becomes whether the
31 See 4 J. TII0MAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 'TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25:69 (401 ed. 1996).
32 See id.
33 See. K. K. Campbell, Playing Coppighl Tag with Your 'Melo 7hgs', TORONTO STAR, June
3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19358916.
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Lanham Act can provide any relief to trademark owners whose repu-
tations are being used to generate revenue for the search engines.
II. THE LANHAM ACT
The substantive federal rights of a trademark owner are set forth
in the Trademark Act of 1946, often referred to as the Lanham Act. 34
In a traditional trademark infringement case, Section 32 (infringe-
ment of a federally registered trademark), 35 Section 43(a) (false des-
ignation of origin),56
 and Section 43(c) (federal trademark dilution)"
34
 SeeTrademark ( Lanham) Act of 1996 §§ 1-50,15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). This section provides in part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imita-
tion of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distri-
bution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to
be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sate,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
Id.
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1). This section provides in part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which—
(A) is likely to cause confitsion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person .. shall be liable hi a civil action by
any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
act.
Id.
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1). This section provides in part:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of eq-
uity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is
provided in this subsection.
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of the Lanham Act often provide a trademark owner with relief from
the unauthorized use of its trademark. These sections provide a
trademark owner with the best means for holding a search engine li-
able for keying a banner ad to one of its trademarks without its con-
sent.
A. Trademath Infringement
Section 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits the use in commerce of
"any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of a reg-
istered trademark" or service mark" where "such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."40 The Lanham Act also
contains a similar provision for unregistered trademarks in Section
43.41 In order for a party to prevail on a claim of infringement under
these provisions, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the mark is valid
and legally protectable; (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff; and (3)
use of the same or a similar mark by the defendant is likely to create
confusion among the relevant consumers. 42
Each of the United States Courts of Appeals has developed its
own test to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists be-
Id.
38 A "trademark" is defined under the Lallilaln Act as:
Any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by
this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
39 A "service mark" is defined under the Lanham Act as:
Any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in comtnerce and applies to register on the principal register established by
this chapter, to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including
a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the
services, even if that source is unknown.'
15 U.S.C. 1127. A service mark is a type of trademark, and all references to "marks" or
"trademarks" in this article also include service marks. See id.
49 15 U.S.G. § 1114(a)(1).
41
 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
41 See Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Stipp, 282, 294-95 (D.N1,1. 1998), alp, 159 F.3d
1351 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472
(3d Cir. 1994); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod. Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.
1991).
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tween two marks.43
 Representative is the Second Circuit's so-called
"Polaroid factors," that are used to determine if there is a likelihood of
confusion: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity
between the two marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the
likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap; (5) actual confu-
sion; (6) the defendant's good faith; (7) the quality of the defendant's
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers."
The strength of the mark analysis focuses on "the distinctiveness
of the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold
under the mark as emanating from 'a particular, although possibly
anonymous source." 45 The stronger or more distinctive a trademark is,
the greater the protection afforded." Marks are classified in the fol-
lowing categories of distinctiveness, from least to greatest, and pro-
tected accordingly: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and
(4) arbitrary or fanciful. 47
A generic mark is generally a common description of goods,"
such as ASPIRIN for acetyl salicylic acid," COLA for a type of soft
drink,50
 or DOS for a type of computer operating system." This type
of "mark" is ineligible for trademark protection." A descriptive mark
describes a product's features, qualities or ingredients in ordinary
language, and the description may be protected only if secondary
meaning is proved." To establish secondary meaning, a plaintiff must
show that, to the public, the product feature or term primarily
identifies the product's source rather than the product itself. 54 Exam-
45 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24.30.
44 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaracl Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
45 W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)).
'' See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2(1 960, 966-67 (6th Cir.
1987).
47 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); Gillette, 984 F.2(1
at 572; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting IATorld, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 	 •
48 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 572.
49 See Bayer CO. V. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511 (S.D.N.\' 1921); 2 MCCARTHY, su-
pra note 31, § 12:18.
50 See Dixi-Cola Lab., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352, 360 (4th Cir. 1941); 2
McCARTue, supra note 31, § 12:18.
51 See In to Digital Research, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1242, 1245 (T.T.A.B. 1987); 2 McCAR-
my, supra note 31, § 12:18.
52
 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 572.
55
 See id.
Seel nwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982).
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pies of descriptive marks are AFTER TAN for an after sunning 1°6°11 55
or RICH 'N CHIPS for chocolate chip cookies.56 A suggestive mark
does not describe the product's attributes but, as the name implies,
merely suggests its features, requiring the purchaser to use imagina-
tion, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of
the goods." HEARTWISE for low-fat, low-cholesterol foods 58 and
ROACH MOTEL for insect traps59 are two examples of marks held to
be suggestive. Lastly, fanciful or arbitrary marks neither suggest nor
describe any characteristic of the particular goods with which it is
used and are eligible for protection without proof of secondary mean-
ing.° Examples of such marks are CLOROX bleach,61 KODAK photo-
graphic supplies62 and APPLE coniputers.°
In determining the degree Of similarity between two marks, a
court must look at whether the respective marks convey the "same
general overall impression" to the purchasing public when viewed
separately.64 In other words, the conflicting marks are to be compared
with respect to similarity of pronunciation, appearance and verbal
translation—this is often referred to as the "sound, sight and mean-
ing" trilogy.65 Next, the proximity of the products factor considers
55 See Aloe Creme Lab., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 533 F.2d 256, 257-58 (5th Cir, 1976);
2 McCARTin, .supra note 31, § 11:24.
56 See In re Keebler Co., 479 F.2d 1405, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1973); 2 McCmcruv, supra note
31, § 11:24.
57 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 572.	 .
59 See Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 E Stipp, 1417, 1435 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (finding trademrk suggestive because it requires imagination and a nuilti-stage
reasoning process to reach the conclusion that such food is "wise for the heart"); 2
McCAnn tv, supra note 31, § 11:72.
99 See American 1-tome Prod. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1978) ("While roaches may live in some motels against the will of the owners, motels are
surely not built for roaches to live in... • [I] is very incongruity is what catches one's atten-
tion."); 2 MCCARTHY, SUM note 31, § 11:72.
60 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 572; Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Costnair, Inc., 651 F.
Supp. 1547, 1554 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
61 See Clorox Chem. Co. v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp., 25 F. Supp. 702, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); 2
MCCARTHY, meta note 31, § 11:8.
62 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 117 (147.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The Ko-
dak trademark is perhaps one of the strongest and most distinctive trademarks in this
country, if not the world."); 2 McCARmy, supra note 31, § 11:8.
65 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 11:13.
64 See Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningsicle Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 140
(2d Cir. 1999); Paco Rabanne Parfums, S.A. v. Norco Enterprises, Inc., 680 F.2d 891, 893
(2d Cir. 1982); Jordache Enter., Inc. v. Levi Strauss Sc Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
ci See, e.g., 3 McCARTifv, supra note 31, § 23:21.
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whether the two products compete with one another. 66 To the extent
goods "serve the same purpose, fall within the same general class, or
are used together, the use of similar designations is more likely to
cause confusion."67 Therefore, a court will often consider whether the
products differ in content, geographic distribution, market position
and audience appeal in evaluating this Polaroid factor."
In a related inquiry, the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap factor requires a court to evaluate whether a plaintiff is
likely to enter the defendant's market, or "bridge the gap" between
the two parties' markets. 69 It recognizes the senior user's interest "in
preserving avenues of expansion and entering into related fields." 7° A
trademark owner's intent to enter the market of the alleged infringer
is indicative of future likelihood of confusion as to source. 71 Next, the
court looks at whether there is any evidence of actual confusion. Al-
though actual confusion is not necessary to prevail on a claim of
trademark infringement, evidence that confusion has actually oc-
curred is a strong indication that a likelihood of confusion exists. 72
The sixth Polaroid factor examines the good faith of the defen-
dant, the junior user, in•selecting the mark. A court looks to "whether
the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on
plaintiff's reputation and goodwill and any confusion between his and
the senior user's product." 73 Evidence that the junior user engaged in
intentional copying may indicate a bad faith intent to create a confus-
ing similarity between the products, giving rise to a presumption of
likelihood of confusion. 74
The court in Polaroid also concluded that the next factor, the
quality of a junior user's product, can be relevant in determining
66 See Morningside Group, 182 F.3d at 140; Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573; Lang v. Retirement
Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2c1576, 582 (2d Cir. 1991).
67
 See Lang, 949 F.2(1 at 582.
66 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 573; C.L.A.S.S. Promotions, Inc. v. D.S. Magazines, Inc., 753
F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1985).
66 See Morningside Group, 182 E3c1 at 141.
76 See id.; Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 504 (2c1 Cir.
1996).
71 See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 874 (2d Cir.
1986);Joulache, 841 F. Supp. at 517.
72
 See Morningside Group, 182 F.3d at 141; Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159
F.3d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1998).
73 See Sports Audi., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996);
Lang, 949 F.2(1 at 583.
74 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1044 (2d Cir.
1992); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 E2d 254, 258-59 (2d Cir. 1987).
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whether there is a likelihood of confusion in two ways. First, an infe-
rior product may cause injury to the plaintiff trademark owner as
people may think that the senior and junior products came from the
same source. 75 Second, products Of equal quality may create confusion
as to their source because of this very shnilarity. 78 Finally, the level of
sophistication of the buyers may contribute to the likelihood of con-
fusion between products. 77 This factor considers the "general impres-
sion of the ordinary purchaser, bUying under the normally prevalent
conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers
usually give in buying that class of goods." 78 The price of the goods or
services is an important consideration when determining the amount
of care the reasonably prudent buyer will exercise. 7° Generally, the
more expensive particular goods or services are, the more likely a
purchaser will use care in selecting such items, thereby lessening the
likelihood of confusion."
In applying criteria like the Polaroid factors discussed above,
courts have made clear that a likelihood of confusion analysis "is not a
mechanical process." 81 Indeed, the factors are nonexclusive, 82 and no
single factor is determinative of the outcome." These criteria merely
provide a guide within which to evaluate whether confusion would be
likely to result from two contested marks. 84
B. False Designation of Origin
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act forbids the use of "any word,
term, name, symbol, or device" that "is likely to cause confusion, or to
75 See Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 505; Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 95 (2c1 Cir.
1993).
7° See Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 505; Nikon, 987 F.2d at 95.
77 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575; McGregor-Doniger, 599 F.2d at 1137.
78 Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575; see MeGregonDoniget; 599 F.2(1 at 1137.
7° See 3 MeCARTitY, supra note 31, § 23:95; see also Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575-76; RJR
Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir, 1979).
80 See Gillette, 984 F.2d at 575-76; McGregor-Doniger; 599 F.2d at 1137; 3 MCCARTHY, sr:-
In-a note 31, § 23:95.
51 See, e.g., Sports Anth,, 89 F.3d at 964; Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d
384, 391 (2d Cir. 1995).
52 See Sports A nth., 89 F.3(1 at 965; Hasbro, Inc. v. Lilian! Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 79 (2d
Cir. 1988); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988); Chandon Cham-
pagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1964).
55 See Plus Prod. v. Plias Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999. 1004 (2d Cir. 1983) ("No
single Polaroid factor is determinative."); 4 N1CCARTHY, suprainote 31, § 24:30.
54 See Lanard Toys, 858 F.2d at 79; Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d at 1186; Chandon Champagne, 335
F.2d at 536.
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cause mistake or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or asso-
ciation." 85
 This section expands trademark protection from not only
confusion as to source, but also includes confusion as to affiliation,
connection or sponsorship. 86 As such, the defendant can be held li-
able for false designation of origin if it is using a mark that is likely to
cause consumers to believe that the defendant's goods or services are
somehow sponsored or affiliated with the plaintiff."
In order to prevail on a claim of false designation of origin under
the Lanham Act, a claimant must establish that (1) a defendant is us-
ing a false designation of origin; (2) that such use of a false designa-
tion occurs in interstate commerce in connection with goods and
services; (3) that such use of false designation is likely to cause confu-
sion, mistake or deception as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of
the defendant's goods or services by another person; and (4) that a
plaintiff has been or is likely to be damaged." The requirement that
the false designation take place in interstate commerce does not re-
quire a defendant to actually cause goods or services to be placed into
the stream of commerce." All that is required is that the false desig-
nation actually occurs there." Additionally, in determining whether
the likelihood of confusion as to origin, sponsorship or approval is
met, a court uses essentially the same criteria as it would use for de-
termining likelihood of confusion under Section 32. 91
C. Initial Consumer Confusion
Since the Lanham Act's protection under Section 32 and 43(a) is
not limited to confusion at the "point of sale," the statute is particu-
85 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
56 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:8 (citing Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Cham-
pions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 111 1 (6th Cir. 1996)). In a case of alleged confusion between
two golf courses, both named CHAMPIONS, the issue was not whether golfers were con-
fused about which course they were playing on, but rather, whether the courses were
affiliated. See Champions, 78 F.3d at 1121. -mid, is the ultimate question to be answered in
the likelihood of confusion inquiry.... The relevant question is whether a golfer, albeit
sophisticated, would likely be confused about affiliation between the two clubs [both
names CHAMPIONS1." Id. (citations omitted); Hartman, Subliminal Confusion: The Misap-
propriation of Advertising Value, 78 TRADEMARK R. 506 (1988).
87 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:8.
85 See AT & T Co. v. Winback and Conserve Fund, 42 F.3d 1426, 1428 (3d Cir. 1994);
Jews forfesus tt Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 309 (D.Ni. 1998).
89 SeeJeurs for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 309 (citing Juno Online Services, L.P. v. Juno Light-
ing, Inc., 979 F. Stipp. 684, 691' (N.D. 111. 1997)).
8° See id.
91 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23.1.
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lowly important in analyzing inetatag and keyed banner ad cases.92 "In-
fringement can be based upon confusion that creates initial customer
interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of
the confusion."93 The similarity between the two marks may aid the
junior user in attracting potential customers that he or she might not
otherwise attract due to the reputation earned by the senior user of
the mark.94 Even if customers would eventually discover that the jun-
92 See Blockbuster Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Laylco, Inc., 869 I Supp. 505, 513
(E.1). Mich. 1994).
93 3 McCmcrt tv, supra note 31, § 23.6; see also Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999); Esercizio V. Roberts, 944
F.2d 1235, 1245 (Oh Cir. 1991); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Stein-
way & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975); Green Prod. v. Independence Corn By-
Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 {N.D. Iowa 1997) ("In essence, 1CBI' is capitalizing
on the strong similarity between Green Products' trademark and 'CBI's domain name to
lute customers onto its web page."); Securacomin Consulting, Inc. v, SCC1111C0111 Inc., 984
F. Supp. 286, 298 (D.NJ. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.3d 182, 183 (3d Cir. 1999);
Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1180 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Kompan
argues correctly that it can prevail by showing that confusion between the Kompan and
Kararan lines and names will mistakenly lead the consumer to believe there is some con-
nection between the two and therefore develop an interest in the Karavan line that it
would not otherwise have had."); Blockbuster, 869 F. Stipp, at 513; Jordache Enter. Inc. v.
Levi Strauss Sc Co,, 841 F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ('Types of confusion that
constitute trademark infringement include where ... potential consumers initially are
attracted to the junior user's mark by virtue of its similarity to the senior user's mark, even
though these consumersrs are not actually confused at the time of purchase."); Sara Lee
Corp. v Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 692CV00460, 1992 WL 436279, at *24 (M.D.N.C. 1992);
Television Enter. Network, Inc. V. Entertainment Network, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 244, 247
{D.N.J. 1986) ("Even if the confusion is cured at some intermediate point before the deal
is completed, the initial confusion may be damaging and wrongful."); Koppers Co. v.
Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("[Slecuring the initial
business contact by the defendant because of an assumed association between the parties is
wrongful even though the mistake is later rectified."). But see Dr. Senn Enter., L.P. v. Pen-
guin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that parody used to
create initial customer interest may be a trademark infringement. even though consumers
were not actually confused at time of sale); Astra Miami. Prod., Inc. v.. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206-08 (1st Cir, 1983) (holding that there was no showing of
likelihood of confusion or actual confusion); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12333, at *3-4 (S.D. 'rex. 1999) (ordering permanent enjoin-
ment against 'POLO' magazine after finding likelihood of confusion between magazine
and Ralph Lauren's POLO designer label), affd in part and vacated and remanded in part,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14631, at *1-2 (5th Cir. June 27, 2000); Teletech Customer Care
Mgm't, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Stipp. 1407, 141(1, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that
initial consumer confusion of web browsers did not amount to a recognizable confusion
tinder trademark laws).
94 See Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2(1 at 1342; Blockbuster, 869 F. Stipp at 512.
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for user is not related to the senior user, a trademark violation can
exist simply from the initial confusion. 95
For example, in 1994, in Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
held that the Lanham Act's protection extended beyond merely the
time when actual purchases take place to protect against confusion
among potential customers. 96 The defendant had argued that its use
of the name "Video Busters" for a video rental store was not confus-
ingly similar to "Blockbuster Video" since customers were not likely to
be confused at the time they actually rented video tapes in a Video
Busters store. 97 The court rejected this argument. The court stated
that even though "a customer would recognize that Video Busters is
not connected to Blockbuster after entry into a Video Busters store
and viewing the Video Busters membership application, brochure,
video cassette jacket, and store layout," this was "unimportant." 98 The
court found that the critical issue was the degree to which the name
"Video Busters" might attract potential customers based on the simi-
larity to the Blockbuster name.99 The court further ruled that
"[b]ecause the names are so similar and the products sold are identi-
cal; some unwitting customers might enter a Video Busters store
thinking it is somehow connected to Blockbuster. Those customers
probably will realize shortly that Video Busters is not related to Block-
buster, but...that is irrelevant." Therefore, the court held that the
defendant's use of the Video Buster name constituted a Lanham Act
violation.
D. Trademark Dilution
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act entitles an owner of a "famous"
trademark to injunctive relief if another party's use of that mark in
commerce causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.un Di-
lution is defined as "the Jessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services." 102 The owner of a famous
95 See Porsche Cars NA, Inc. v. Manny's Barshop, Inc., 972 F. Stipp. 1128, 1131 (N.D.
111. 1997); Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Stipp. 547, 551 (S.D.N.'t 1996).
99
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mark is also entitled to monetary damages where the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the
owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. 103 Dilu-
tion is a cause of action reserved only for those marks with such pow-
erful consumer associations that even non-competing uses can im-
pinge on their value. 104 Marks that have been found to meet the
"famous" requirement under the Act include BUDWEISER for
beer,105 NAILTIQUES for fingernail care products 106 and CANDY-
LAND as the name of a children's game,'"
In order to succeed on a dilution claim, a plaintiff must establish
four elements: (1) that its mark is famous; 108 (2) the defendant is
making commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defen-
dant's use began after the plaintiff's mark became famous; and (4)
the defendant's use presents a likelihoodwg of dilution of the distinc-
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Jerre forjesus, 993 F. Stipp. at 305.
"4 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d. 868, 875 (9th Cir, 1999). See gener-
al15, Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HAM'. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927).
195 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1543 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
"6 See Nailtiqucs Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
197 See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment. Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480
(W.D. Wash. 1996).
108 In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider the
following factors:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services whit which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunc-
tion is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third par-
ties; and
(I-I) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1005, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (I).
109 Although most courts and commentators have interpreted the Lanham Act to re-
quire only a likelihood of dilution, the Fourth Circuit recently field that proof of likeli-
hood of dilution is insufficient to allow a claimant. to recover under the Act. Under the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Ringling Bros.-Barnum Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Dim
Of navel Den, the court held that proof of actual dilution is necessary before a plaintiff can
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tive value of the mark. 11° A plaintiff does not need to show that it is in
competition with defendant or that customers are likely to be con-
fused by defendant's use. 111
Dilution usually occurs through blurring or tarnishment, al-
though it is not limited to these categories. 112 Blurring involves a
"whittling away" of the selling power and value of a trademark by the
unauthorized use of the mark. 113 "This occurs when a prospective cus-
tomer sees the plaintiff's mark used by other persons to identify dif-
ferent sources of different goods and services, thus weakening the
distinctive significance of the mark to identify and distinguish the
source;" 114 for example, SONY for gym shoes, FORD for crystal vases,
succeed on a dilution claim under federal law. See 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 1209 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
"° See Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 880; Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1324, 1326-27 (9111 Cir. 1998).
In See 15 U.S.C. § 1 127; Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Stipp. at 305; Porsche Cars, 972 F. Stipp. at
1132. Under state dilution statutes, there is a split of authority over whether the anti-
dilution provisions are applicable where the parties are in competition. The Second Cir-
cuit interpreting the New York state statute and the Restatement has taken the position,
however, that dilution can result from the unauthorized use of the mark on competing
goods. See 4 McCAnnty, supra note 31, § 24.72.
112 See Panavision Intl, 141 F.3d at 1324;fewsfarfesus, 993 F. Stipp. at 307.
its See Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 306 n.30; Panavision 	 L.I'. v. Toeppen, 995 F.
Stipp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
I "Jeurs for Jesus, 993 F. Stipp. at 306 n.30; see 3 MeCAirritv, supra note 31, § 29;94. A
number of federal courts have adopted the six factor balancing test developed by judge
Sweet in Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., for determining whether the
vague concept of "blurring" applied to a specific case:
1) similarity of the marks
2) similarity of the products covered by the marks
3) sophistication of consumers
4) predatory intent
5) renown of the senior mark
6) renown of the junior mark
875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2c1 Cir. 1989) (Sweet, j., concurring). These factors, however, are not
universally accepted. Recently, the First Circuit agreed with commentators such as Thomas
McCarthy that these factors "are the offspring of classical likelihood of confusion analysis
and are not particularly relevant or helpful in resolving the issues of dilution .by blurring."
Lund Trading v. Kohler Co„ 163 F.3d 27, 49 (1st Cir. 1998). The First Circuit noted McCar-
thy's conclusion that only two of the factors—the similarity of the marks and the renown of
the senior mark—are relevant to the dilution analysis. See id. The First Circuit rejected
these factors, concluding that the "'familiar test of similarity used in the traditional likeli-
hood of confusion test cannot be the guide [for dilution analysis], for likelihood of confu-
sion is not the test of dilution'.... Instead, the inquiry is into whether target customers
are likely to view the products 'as essentially the same.'" Id. at 50 (quoting 3 MCCARTHY,
supra note 31, § 24.94.1); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117,
134 (D. Mass. 1999).
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or NIKE for computer printers. "The basic idea of blurring is that the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark causes the public no longer to
think only of the plaintiffs product upon seeing the famous mark,
but rather to associate both the plaintiff and the defendant with the
mark."115
Tarnishment arises when a defendant's use of a mark similar to a
plaintiff's mark presents a danger that consumers will form unfavor-
able associations with the mark. 115 This can occur when the unauthor-
ized use of a famous mark is linked to products of poor quality or is
portrayed in an unwholesome manner, such that the positive associa-
tions and the distinctive quality of a plaintiff's mark is degraded. 117
For example, in one of the first cases to apply the federal law of dilu-
tion to acts within cyberspace, the court held that Hasbro's famous
CANDYLAND mark was tarnished by the defendant's use of "candy-
land.corn" as a domain name for a sexually explicit web site. 118
III. THE METATAG CASES
Despite a proliferation of cases dealing with domain names, to
date there has been only one reported decision in which a trademark
owner has sued a search engine for using its marks to key banner ads
without its consent. 119 Although domain name controversies touch on
some of the same issues as keyed banner ads, metatag cases provide an
even better analogy as to how banner ad cases should be evaluated
and decided.
A banner ad is essentially a third party metatag. Instead of the
web site owner merely inserting', its competitors trademarks into its
own website and hoping that it ends up high on the returned hit list,
a banner ad keyed to the same marks by the search engine guarantees
the web site owner a prominent, spot on all search results for those
particular terms. Whether the web site owner uses its competitor's
marks as metatagswithin its own web site or purchases banner ads for
those marks from the search engines, the result is still the same—the
web site owner is able to position itself so that a search engine user is
more easily lured onto its site instead of the site he or she is actually
seeking.
115 Clue Computing, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
116 See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3(1 at 881.
117 See Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Stipp. at 306 n.31.
118 See Internet Entertainment Group, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1480.
119 See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072
(C.D. Cal. 1999).
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In one of the first cases involving metatags, Playboy filed suit
against Calvin Designer Label for using Playboy's trademarks within
its web site. 120 The court found defendants had registered and were
using the domain name "playmate.com ."1" The defendants also were
using the "PLAYBOY" and "PLAYMATE" marks within their web sites,
promoting the defendants' own magazine titled "PLAYMATE LIVE
MAGAZINE."122 Additionally, the defendants used the mark "PLAY-
BOY' as a metatag on their own web site and placed the terms
"PLAYBOY' and "PLAYBOY MAGAZINE" in "hidden text" throughout
the site. 123 The text was "hidden" by placing the terms in all black text
on an all black background. 124
 Therefore, although an Internet user
could not see the metatags or "hidden text", a search engine could. As
a result of the defendants use of these terms within its web site, the
defendants' site was typically the first or second site returned in a
search for these terms. 125
Playboy alleged that the defendants' conduct constituted federal
trademark infringement, false designation of origin under the Lan-
ham Act, federal trademark dilution, trademark counterfeiting and
common law trademark infringement. 126 The court agreed and en-
joined the defendants from using Playboy's trademarks or any other
term likely to cause confusion therewith within its web site, as a do-
main name, within "hidden text" or as a metatag. 127 The court also
granted Playboy's motion for summary judgment on all five of its
claims and entered a permanent injunction against the defendants. 128
In Playboy Enterprise, Inc. v. Asiafocus International, Inc., a court
again was faced with an infringing use of Playboy's trademarks.m
Playboy filed claims of trademark infringement, false designation of
120 See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 1999 WL 329058, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff and entering injunction); see also 985 F.
Stipp. 1218, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (issuing temporary restraining order); 985 F. Stipp.
1220, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (entering preliminary injunction).
121
 See Calvin Designer Label, 1999 181 329058, at *2.
122 See id. at *2-3.
125
 See id. at *1
124 See id.; see also Scott Shipman, Comment, 7'radeinark and Unfair Competition in Cyber-
space.. Can These Laws Deter "Baiting" Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CEARA L. REV. 245, 265
(1998).
125 See Shipman, supra note 124, at 265-66.
126 See Calvin Designer Label, 1999 WL 329058, at *1.
127 See id, at *3.
128 See id.
129 See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Asiafocus Ina Inc., 1998 WI. 724000, at *1 (ED. Va.
1998).
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origin, unfair competition, trademark dilution, common law trade-
mark infringement and common law unfair competition against the
defendants for their use of Playboy's marks in connection with several
Internet web sites that they operated.'" In granting a motion for a
default judgment, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia found that the defendants had used the "PLAYBOY"
and "PLAYMATE" marks throughout their web sites, on goods offered
online, as part of their e-mail address ("playmates@pinmailcom")
and within their domain names ("ASIAN-PLAYMATES.COM " and
"PLAYMATES-ASIAN. COM ") . 131
The court also found that the defendants bad:
[p]urposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract consum-
ers to their Web site under the guise that their sites are spon-
sored by or somehow affiliated with [Playboy]. Specifically,
the defendants embedded [Playboy's] trademarks 'playboy'
and 'playmate' within the Web sites' computer source code
which is visible to 'search engines' that look for Web sites
containing specific words or phrases specified by computer
users.'"
The court noted that a search engine user conducting a search for
Playboy's web site by typing in the trademark "PLAYBOY" or "PLAY-
MATE" would receive a list that included the defendants' "Asian-
playmates" web sites. 133 The court found that "[t]hrough the defen-
dants' willful deception, consumers have been misled into believing
the asian-playmates Web site is connected with, or somehow spon-
sored by, [Playboy]. "134
Additionally, in connection with the plaintiff's federal trademark
dilution claim, the court held that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence to establish that the blurring of the distinctiveness
of the "PLAYMATE" and "PLAYBOY" marks was willful.'" The court
found that the defendants' "purposeful tactic of embedding the
trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden computer source
code" was particularly illustrative of such willfulness. 136 The court
Is° See id.
131 See id. at *7.
132 Id. at *3.
133 See id.
131 Asiafactis Int?, 1998 WI, 724000, at *3.
133 See id. at *8.
134 Id.
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stated that this "strategy epitomizes the 'blurring' of [Playboy's]
trademarks. When a search engine led a consumer to the asian-
playmates Web site in response to a search of [Playboy's] trademarks,
the consumer would probably believe that the defendants' Web site'
was affiliated with [Playboy]."137 The court awarded Playboy
$1,000,000 for the willful infringement embodied in the defendants'
web sites, $2,000,000 for the willful infringement by offer for sale of
merchandise utilizing the plaintiffs trademarks, as well as attorney's
fees. 138
Similarly in SNA, Inc. v. Array, the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, following a bench trial, permanently enjoined the defendants
from the further use of the plaintiffs' SEAWIND mark as a metatag. 139
The court found the defendants' use of the plaintiffs' mark as a meta-
tag and its insertion of a block of text repeating the words "Seawind,"
"SEAWIND," and "seawind" on its web site amounted to an unfair
trade practice. 149
 The court concluded that "defendants intentionally
use plaintiffs' mark in this way to lure internet users to their site in-
stead of [the plaintiffs'] official site. This is true whether the meta
tagging is visible or hidden in the code, and no matter what the web-
site's domain name is." 141 The court also found that the defendants'
actions amounted to a "bad faith effort to confuse Internet users that
is likely to succeed. "142
The defendant in Niton Corporation v. Radiation Monitoring Devices,
Inc. was also enjoined from using the plaintiffs trademarks as meta-
tags within its web site. 143 It appears that the defendant had not only
used the plaintiff's name as a metatag, but had copied all of the meta-
tags that the plaintiff had used in designing its own web site. 144 The
court held that this method of attracting Internet users to defendant's
web site was likely to lead users to believe that the defendant was
I " Id.
13° See id. at *9.
13° See SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
14° See id. at 562-63.
141 Id.
112 See id. at 563.
143
 Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D.
Mass. 1998).
144 See id.
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affiliated with the plaintiff. 145 Other district courts that have looked at
the metatag issue have ruled in a similar manner. 146
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, a court for the first time held
that the use of another entity's trademark as a metatag without its
consent constituted a "fair use" of that trademark owner's mark. 147
Playboy filed suit in 1998 against Terri Welles, a self-employed model
and spokesperson who began her modeling career with Playboy
magazine almost twenty years earlier. 148 In May of 1980, the defendant
had appeared on the cover of Playboy's magazine and was featured as
the "Playmate of the Month" in the December 1980 issue. 119 The de-
fendant then received the "Playmate of the Year" award in June of
1081. 150 Additionally, since 1980 the defendant appeared in no less
than thirteen issues of Playboy magazine and eighteen newsstand spe-
cials published by Playboy. 151 As a result, the defendant claimed that
she had always referred to herself as a "Playmate" or a "Playmate of
the Year" and that this was with the knowledge of plaintiff. 152
In June of 1997, the defendant began operating a web site that
included photographs of herself and others (both nude and clothed),
a fan club posting board, an autobiOgraphy section and a listing of
current events and personal appearances. 155 The domain name for
the web site was "terriwelles.com " and both the heading and title of
the web page read "Terri Welles—Playboy Playmate of the Year
1981,"154 Additionally, each of the pages of the web site used the
'" See id, at 105.
118 See, e.g., Playboy Enter. Intl, Inc. v. Global Site Designs, Inc., 1999 WL 311707, at *2
(S.D. Fl. 1999) (ordering preliminary enjoinment stopping inter alia contimicd use of
plaintiff's marks or any marks confUsingly similar thereto within defendant's web site, as
part of a domain name or as metatag); Nettis Envtl. Ltd. v. IWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 222,
228-29 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (entering consent decree that required defendant to review
offending metatags; at. issue was whether defendant had adequately complied wills that
order); McGraw v. Salmon, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10987, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoin-
ing defendant front using names of Reba McEntire, Trisha Yearwood, Vince Gill, Randy
Travis, as well as a number of other country music singers and bands as trademarks within
his web sites, as domain names or as metatags); Oppedahl 8c Larson v. Advanced Concepts,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23105, at *1-2 (D. Colo. 1997) (enjoining defendants from using
the trademark OPPEDAHL & LARSON on its website).
147 See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 7 . F. Supp. 2d 1098,1104 (S.D. Cal, 1998), affil,
162 E3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998).
148 See id. at 1099-100.
148 See id. at 1100.
17'0 See id.
114 See id.
182 See Mlles, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
In See id.
I" See id.
870	 Boston College Law Review	 (Vol. 41:847
phrase "PMOY '81" as a repeating watermark in the background and
the defendant used the terms "PLAYBOY" and "PLAYMATE" as meta-
tags. 155
According to the defendant, eleven of the fifteen free web pages
included a disclaimer at the bottom of the page. 156 It read as follows:
"This site is neither endorsed, nor sponsored by, nor affiliated with
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. PLAYBOY, PLAYMATE OF THE YEAR and
PLAYBOY OF THE MONTH are registered trademarks of Playboy En-
terprises, Inc."157 This disclaimer varied in font size, depending on the
space limitations of the individual page upon which it appeared. 155
The plaintiff alleged federal trademark infringement, false des-
ignation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, federal
trademark dilution and several state law violations. 159 Plaintiff sought
a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from using the
phrase "Playmate of the Year" as the title of her home page, using the
watermark "PMOY '81" in the background and using the trademarks
"PLAYBOY' and "PLAYMATE" as metatags. 1 " Plaintiff argued that the
defendant's conduct was harming the company itself, as well as its
trademarks, as web—surfing consumers were likely to believe that de-
fendant's web site was authorized, sponsored or otherwise approved
by Playboy, when in fact it was not. 161 The defendant claimed she
merely used the title "Playmate of the Year" and the abbreviation
"PMOY' in a descriptive manner in order to identify herself to her
customers. 162 Additionally, she argued that all of her other uses of
plaintiff's trademarks were used solely in an "editorial fashion."163
The court initially noted that the term "PLAYBOY" has gained
widespread public recognition and is distinctive due to the success
and popularity of the plaintiffs magazine and related publications.'"
The court found that the other trademarks such as "PLAYMATE" are
not only related to Playboy magazine but are also titles bestowed upon




157 Welles, 7 F. Stipp. 2d at 1100-01.
158 See id. at 1 1 00.
155 See id. at 1099-100.
160
 See id. at 1101.
161
 See id.
162 See Welles, 7 F. Stipp. 2c1 at 1101.
163 See id.
164 ,See id. at 1102 (citing Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pubrg, Inc., 687 F.2d 563,
566-67 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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[T]he terms Playmate, Playmate of the Month, and Playmate
of the Year are titles which Playboy magazine awards to cer-
tain Playboy models, who then use the title to describe them-
selves. Much like Academy Award winners, crowned Miss
Americas, and Heisman Trophy winners, Playboy Playmates
are given a title which becomes part of their identity and
adds value to their name. 165
These winners, the court noted, not only represent the awarding or-
ganization or sponsor, but the title becomes part of their public im-
age. 166
The court explained that trademark law recognizes a "fair use"
defense when a mark is being used only to describe the goods or sell,-
ices of a party or their geographic origin. 167 The "fair use" defense, in
essence, forbids a trademark owner from appropriating a descriptive
term for his or her exclusive use and preventing others from accu-
rately describing a characteristic of their goods. 168 The court found
that the defendant's use of the term "Playmate of the Year" and the
abbreviation "PMOY '81" was merely a means of identifying and de-
scribing herself.
Additionally, the court noted that the defendant minimized her
references to Playboy on her web site so as not to "trick consumers
into believing that they are viewing a Playboy-endorsed website," 69
The court found that:
[s]he does not use Playboy or Playmate in her domain name,
she does not use the classic Playboy bunny logo, she inserted
disclaimers which clearly state that the website is not en-
dorsed by [Playboy], and the font of the Playmate of the Year
1981 title is not.recognizable as a Playboy magazine font. 170
165 Id.
166 See id.
167 See Welles, 7 F. Stipp. 2d at 1103 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4)). Section 1115(b) (4)
provides that "fair use" is established where "the use of the name, term, or device charged
to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a :nark, ... which is descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of 1a] party, or their
geographic origin." 15 U.S.C. § 1115(1)) (4).
lee See New Kids on the Block v. News America Pubrg, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1992); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980); Mlles, 7 F.
Stipp. 2d at 1103.
169 Welles, 7 F. Stipp. 2d at 1103-04.
17° Id. at 1104.
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As such, the court found that the defendant used the terms "Playmate
of the Year 1981" and "PMOY '81" in good faith and that her use thus
constituted a "fair use" under the Lanham Act."'
Furthermore, the court found that the defendant used the
"PLAYBOY" and "PLAYMATE" marks as metatags in good faith merely
to index the contents of her web site. 172 In particular, the court noted
the defendant's use of the term "PLAYBOY" was not an infringement
because it referenced not only her identity as a "Playboy Playmate of
the Year 1981," but her legitimate editorial uses of the term, for ex-
ample, discussing the Playboy Mansion.'" As such, the court held that
the defendant had used the plaintiffs trademarks in good faith and in
a descriptive manner, and, thus, her actions did not constitute trade-
mark infringement, false designation of origin or trademark dilution
in violation of the Lanham Act. 174
Only one federal appellate court has published a judicial opinion
on metatags. In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertain-
ment Corp., Brookfield appealed the district court's denial of its mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting West Coast from using
Brookfield's registered trademark "MOVIEBUFF" or a mark confus-
ingly similar thereto. 178
 At issue was whether West Coast was infringing
on Brookfield's trademark rights through its use and operation of a
web site with the domain name "moviebuff.com " containing a search-
able entertainment database similar to Brookfield's "MOVIEBUFF"
product. 176 Additionally, Brookfield claimed West Coast's inclusion of
the term "MOVIEBUFF" as a metatag for the site infringed Sections
32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'"
After performing a likelihood of confusion analysis, the court
held that the defendant's use of "moviebuffcom" as a domain name
for its web site violated the Lanham Act. 178 The court then turned to
the issue of whether the defendant was also prohibited from using the






174 See Welles, 7 F. Stipp. 2d at 1104-05.
175 See 174 F.3d 1036,1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
176 See id. at 1043.
"7 See id. at 1061.
178
 See id.
I 79See id. at 1061-65. The defendant also operated a web site at <www. westcoast-
video.com >. See id. at 1062.
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found that such a use of the plaintiffs trademark in the defendant's
web site as a metatag would result in "initial interest confusion." 180
The court explained that search engine users looking for
Brookfield's•"MOVIEBUFF" products may be taken to one of defen-
dant's web sites as a result of a search pet -formed using that term."'
The court stated that once there, a sizeable number of consumers
who were originally looking for Brookfield's entertainment database
would instead utilize West Coast's similar product. 182
 The court rec-
ognized that there was no source confusion in the traditional sense, as
consumers would know they were patronizing West Coast rather than
Brooltheld. 183 Nevertheless, the court held that by using "MOVIE-
BUFF" as a metatag for their web sites, West Coast sought to divert
people looking for Brookfield's "MOVIEBUFF" product and, as a re-
sult of such initial interest confusion, improperly benefited from the
goodwill that Brookfield had developed in its mark. 184
The court explained that the defendant's use of Brookfield's
trademark as a metatag was analogous to posting a sign with another's
trademark in front of one's store. 185 The court provided the following
example to illustrate:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster")
puts up a billboard on a highway reading—"West Coast
Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7"—where West Coast is really
located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Cus-
tomers looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7
and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast,
but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway en-
trance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who pre-
fer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue
searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right
there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they
are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster
and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is re-
lated to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Neverthe-
less, the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion








188 See Brookfield Communications. 174 F.3d at 1064.
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does not alter the fact that Blockbuster would be misappro-
priating West Coast's acquired goodwill. 186
The court concluded that the Lanham Act barred West Coast from
using Brookfield's "MOVIEBUFF" mark or any similar term. 187
Additionally, the court emphasized that it was in no way restrict-
ing the defendant's right to use terms in a manner that would consti-
tute a "fair use" under the Lanham Act. 188 The court explained that it
was well established that the Lanham Act does not prevent one from
using a competitor's mark in comparative advertising or in truthfully
identifying the competitor's goods. 189 The court noted that defendant
could include on its own web site, for example, an advertisement ask-
ing "Why pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for
FREE? "190
Moreover, the court approvingly cited the Playboy Entelrises, Inc.
v. Welles case, stating that it agreed that West Coast could legitimately
use an appropriate descriptive term in its metatags, such as "MOVIE
BUFF."191
 The court noted that the defendant could use the term
"MOVIE BUFF," as it was an appropriate term for describing someone
who is .a motion picture enthusiast. 192 The court held, however, that
the defendant could not use the term "MOVIEBUFF" as a metatag. 195
The court explained that although the terms "MOVIE BUFF" and
"MOVIEBUFF" differed by only a single space, that difference was
pivota1. 194
 The court held that while "MOVIE BUFF" was a proper de-
scriptive term for a movie devotee, the term "MOVIEBUFF" was not a
word in the English language and is used merely to describe
186 Id. (citing Blockbuster Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505,
513 (ED. Mich. 1994)); see also Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that consumers attracted to parody of defendant's mark
know that it is not defendant's product); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818
F.2d 254, 260' (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that initial interest confusion is sufficient for in-
fringement claim); Green Prod. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F.
Supp. 1070, 1076 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (rejecting argument that court should not consider
confusion over domain names, but only actual consumer confusion in making purchases).
187
 See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1065.
188 See id.
idg See id.; New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306-09; Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562,
563 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that copyist may use the originator's mark to identify product
that it has copied).
19° See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1066.
'9 ' See id. at 1065-66.
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Brookfield's products and services. 195 As such, any use by West Coast
of the "MOVIEBUFF" mark as a metatag would only serve to attract
people to its web site in violation of the Lanham Act. 128
IV. BANNER AD CASES: THE PAST AND THE FUTURE
To date only one court has rendered an opinion in a case involv-
ing the keying of banner ads by a search engine to a trademark with-
out the owner's consent. This decision is problematic,, however, in a
number of ways. It appears not only to be a clear departure from the
holdings of the analogous metatag cases, but a departure from fun-
damental tenets of trademark law as well.
A. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
In April of 1999 in Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Netscape Communica-
tions, Playboy filed a motion for preliminary injunction against Net-
scape Communications Corp. ("Netscape") and Excite, Inc. ("Ex-
cite"). 197 Netscape and Excite are two search engines that sell
keywords for banner advertisements. 198 At issue in this case was the
defendants sale of the words "PLAYBOY" and "PLAYMATE" for ban-
ner advertisements promoting adult entertainment goods and serv-
ices. 199 Plaintiff claimed that by marketing and selling the "PLAYBOY"
and "PLAYMATE" terms to other entities, programming the banner
ads to run in response to these search terms and actually displaying
the banner ad on the user's search results page, the defendants in-
fringed and diluted its registered trademarks. 20° The court disagreed
and denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction." 1
 The
court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish a likelihood of suc-
cess on its claims for a number of reasons." 2
According to the court, the plaintiff had not shown that the de-
fendants actually used plaintiff's trademarks in commerce. 205 The
court reasoned that:
195 See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3'cl at 1066.
196 See id.




261 See id. at 1076.
"2 See Netscape Communications, 55 F. Sapp. 2d at 1076.
2°3 See id. at 1073-74.
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Playboy can only contend that the use of the words "playboy"
and "playmate," as keywords or search terms, is equivalent to
the use of the trademarks "Playboy®" and "Playmate®."
However, it is undisputed that an Internet user cannot con-
duct a search using the trademark form of the words, i.e.
Playboy® and Playmate®. Rather, the user enters the generic
word "playboy" or "playmate". . . [Playboy] has not shown
that defendants use the terms in their trademark form, i.e.
Playboy® and Playmate®, when marketing to advertisers or
in the algorithm that effectuates the keying of the ads to the
keywords. Thus, plaintiff's argument that defendants 'use'
plaintiff's trademarks falls short. 2°4
The court continued, explaining that "[e]ven if use of the ge-
neric 'playboy' and 'playmate' [terms] were construed to be use [of]
the trademark terms," the plaintiff's trademark infringement claim
failed as it did not show likelihood of confusion. 205 The plaintiff had
cited Brookfield Communications, Inc. u West Coast Entertainment Corp. for
the proposition that defendants' acts were likely to lead to initial con-
sumer confusion. 206 The court held that Brookfield did not provide
support for the plaintiff's claim and distinguished it on two
grounds. 207 First, the court stated that the trademark at issue in
Brookfield, "MOVIEBUFF," was not.a real word, while "PLAYBOY' and
"PLAYMATE" are words within the English language. 208 The court
pointed out that entities other than plaintiff also have valid trade-
marks containing the words "PLAYBOY" or "PLAYMATE," for exam-
ple, the federal registration of W.E. Bailey & Son, Inc.'s "PLAYBOY"
mark for "fresh yams and sweet potatoes." 209
 The court reasoned that
"[a}lthough the trademark terms and the English language words [in
this case] are undisputedly identical . . . , the holder of a trademark
may not remove a word from the English language merely by acquir-
ing trademark rights in it." 210
 Second, the court held that Brookfield
was distinguishable because it involved parties competing in the same
market, whereas Playboy and the search engine operators do not. 2 "
204 Id.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 1074.
207




 See id. at 1079.
210
 See id. at 1074.
211
 See id. at 1074-75.
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As to the dilution claim, the court held that the plaintiff failed to
prove blurring of its marks, in part because Playboy "has not shown
that defendant uses its marks Playboy® and Playmate®."212 Addition-
ally, the court held that plaintiff had not presented any evidence that
defendants' "use of the words `playboy' and `playmate' causes any sev-
erance of the association between plaintiff and its marks Playboy®
and Playmatee."2 " As to plaintiffs claim that the defendants' keying
of banner ads that are more sexually explicit than Playboy resulted in
tarnishment, the court stated that "plaintiff's argument is based on
the incorrect assumption that defendants use plaintiffs marks, rather
than the generic words 'playboy' and `playmate." 2 " The court held
that "[a]doption of plaintiffs tarnishment [argument] would secure
near-monopoly control of the placement of plaintiffs marks and the
associated goods and services on the Internet" and that a greater
showing of harm was required in order for relief to be granted on the
dilution clahn. 215
The court's reasoning is misguided. First, there is no require-
ment under the trademark laws that in order to qualify as an in-
fringement the ® symbol must be used as the court's argument ap-
pears to suggest. Furthermore, the mere fact that the registered
trademark "PLAYBOY" can also be used to describe a "wealthy, care-
free man devoted to the pleasures of nightclubs, sports, and female
company" 216 does not automatically immunize a party from liability
for using such a term. The critical issue is how the particular defen-
dant is using the term—as a trademark or in a descriptive fashion to
describe aspects of one's own goods. 217
The claim that these terms were being used in the primary de-
scriptive sense is highly suspect because the defendants were market-
ing the terms "PLAYBOY' and "PLAYMATE" to companies that offer
adult entertainment goods and services. It is difficult not to infer that
the defendants were attempting to capitalize on the goodwill associ-
ated with the "PLAYBOY" and "PLAYMATE" trademarks when they
marketed and sold banner ads keyed to these terms to plaintiff's
competitors. Additionally, the fact that "PLAYBOY' also functions as a
212 Netscape Communications, 55 F. Stipp. 2d at 1075.
215 id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1076.
215 TIIE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF TIIE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1005 (William
Morris ed., 1973).
2" See Car—Freshner Gasp. v. S.C. Johnson &Sot!, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995).
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trademark for "fresh yams and sweet potatoes" is irrelevant, as defen-
dants were not marketing these keywords to sellers of fruits and vege-
tables. Instead, the defendants were offering ads keyed to the "PLAY-
BOY" and "PLAYMATE" terms to companies that sold adult
entertainment goods and services.
The fact that the plaintiff and defendants are not technically
"competitors" also is not detrimental to plaintiffs clahu of trademark
infringement. The Lanham Act prohibits not only the sale of goods
and services hearing a trademark without consent, but the advertising
of such goods and services as well. 218 Although the Act limits the li-
ability of publishers and broadcasters, such as radio and television sta-
tions that carry advertisements that contain infringing trademarks,
the limitation only applies to "innocent" infringement. 219 A publisher
or broadcaster is not "innocent" if it knew that the advertisement was
false or infringing or proceeded to publish the advertisement with
"reckless disregard" as to whether it was false or infringing. 220 For ex-
ample, in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. R.M. Post, Inc., the plaintiff
alleged that defendants published a telephone directory yellow pages
advertisement for a former "CENTURY 21" real estate dealer that
contained a reference to the "CENTURY 21" mark. 221 Allegations that
the defendants published the advertisement with the knowledge that
the dealer was not a franchisee authorized to use the trademark was
held sufficient to allege non-innocent infringement and state a claim
under the Lanham Act. 222
218 See 15 U.S.C.§ 1114;15 U.S.C.§1125(a)(1)(B).
219
 Section 15 U.S.0 § 1119(2) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the remedies given to
the owner of a right infringed under this chapter or to a person bringing an
action under section 1125(a) or (d) shall be limited as follows:
(A) Where an infringer or violator is engaged solely in the business of print-
ing the mark or violating matter for others and establishes dint he or she was
an innocent infringer or innocent violator, the owner of the right infringed
or person bringing the action under section 1125(a) of-this title shall be end-
tiled as against such infringer or violator only to an injunction against future
printing.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:8.
220 See 9 IreleCmcrtiv, supra note 31, § 25:29. This definition incorporates the Constitu-
tional standards of U.S. Supreme Court defamation cases such as the famous case of New
lin* Times Co. u Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
221 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:29 (discussing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
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The defendants' conduct in this case was even more problematic.
The search engine owners were not merely placing an advertisement
that they suspected might contain an infringing trademark. They were
purposely selling the right to use the goodwill associated with the
plaintiff's mark to improperly lure search engine users to the adver-
tiser's site. By selling the banner ads keyed to the plaintiff's trade-
marks, the defendants were offering advertisers the ability to attract
consumers at the plaintiffs expense—and making a substantial profit
for themselves. 223
On the dilution claim, it is difficult to see how the defendants'
activities did not amount to willful dilution, particularly by blurring.
By intentionally programming the search engine so that a banner ad
for another product appears in response to the plaintiff's famous
trademarks being entered by a user, the defendants are willfully di-
minishing the capacity of the marks to distinguish the plaintiff's
goods and services. Additionally, if the plaintiff could actually show
that the banner ads linked to its trademarks were for much more
sexually explicit material than plaintiff offers, then its claim that con-
sumers would form unfavorable associations with its mark is clearly
not without merit.
B. Evaluating Banner Ad Cases in the Future
Despite the decision in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Commu-
nications , the Lanham Act clearly provides a basis for finding liability
for the keying of a banner ad to a trademark without the owner's con-
sent. As the closely analogous metatag cases illustrate, using another's
trademark and the relevant technology to lure a party onto a web site
is a violation of the Lanham Act. This should not be different merely
because the party that is manipulating the technology happens to he a
search engine owner as opposed to a web site operator. Our hypo-
thetical shopper trying to find a florist on the Internet demonstrates
how the holdings in the metatag cases and the provisions of the Lan-
ham Act may provide a trademark owner with relief from the unau-
thorized keying of its trademark to a banner advertisement.
243 See supra Part 1.
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1. Trademark Infringement
As discussed above,224 in order to state a claim for trademark in-
fringement, a plaintiff must establish that defendant's use of its
trademark is likely to cause confusion. Implicit in such a requirement
is that a defendant must actually use the mark as a trademark, and not
merely as a descriptive term. Therefore, even before reaching the
confusion inquiry, it is essential to determine if the defendant's con-
duct constitutes trademark usage.
For example, if a search engine operator used the word "APPLE"
to key banner ads to computer products, this would amount to the
use of the Apple Computer Company's trademark by the search en-
gine. However, if the word "APPLE" was keyed to ads for an apple or-
chard or a fruit growers trade association, it would appear that this
mark was being used as a descriptive term for a type of fruit. As such,
the marketing and selling of the word "APPLE" to key banner ads in
this manner would not constitute trademark use by the search engine.
The next issue is whether such trademark use causes confusion.
In banner ad cases, like metatag cases, such confusion is likely to be in
the form of initial interest confusion. Infringement can be based
upon confusion that creates initial consumer interest, even if no sale
is completed as a result of such confusion. 225 In metatag cases, this
theory has proven instrumental in holding a web site owner liable for
using a competitor's trademark as a metatag. 226
This is not initial consumer confusion in a traditional sense be-
cause, in a banner ad case or a metatag case, the confusion is caused
by the intentional manipulation of the search engine. Therefore, the
next question is whether this confusion is likely to result in the search
engine user going to web sites he or she was not actually seeking when
the search was performed. The test becomes whether this search en-
gine confusion is likely to cause initial consumer interest—a standard
that turns on many of the same factors employed in a traditional like-
lihood of confusion case.
For example, in the first advertisement our shopper encoun-
tered, it would appear that initial interest confusion is likely. The
search engine has keyed the "FTD" mark to a banner advertisement
for a hypothetical company named Teleflorist, Although our shopper
may recognize that Teleflorist is different than Florist Transworld De-
224 See supra Part III (A).
225 See supra Part. III (C).
226 See supra Part IV.
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livery ("FTD"), there is a likelihood that our shopper may become
interested in this company, when he or she might not otherwise have
been due to the intentional manipulation of the search engine. This
likelihood is significant because FTD and the hypothetical Teleflorist
company both provide florist-locating services, the average consumer
of such services probably will not exercise a high degree of care and
the defendant search engine clearly lacked good faith when it keyed
the "FTD" mark to the Teleflorist ad.
The likelihood of consumer attraction would exist even if the
Teleflorist advertisement stated that it was not affiliated with Florist
Transworld Delivery or the banner ad consisted of a comparative ad-
vertisement discussing why Teleflorist's services were superior to
FTD's. This is not to suggest that the use of the "FTD" mark within a
Teleflorist banner ad will always constitute an infringement such that
a "fair use" defense is inapplicable. If the comparative ad was keyed to
a term like "flowers" or "florist," a search engine could not be held
liable for trademark infringement. When it is keyed to the term
"FTD," however, the situation is quite different as the search engine is
clearly attempting to capitalize on the goodwill associated with the
"FTD" mark.
2. False Designation of Origin
The second banner ad encountered by our hypothetical shopper,
the advertisement for "Joe's Flower Shop," provides an example of a
potential false designation of origin claim. The search engine's use of
the "FTD" mark in connection with this advertisement is likely to sug-
gest to a consumer that Joe's Flower Shop is part of the FTD network
of florists, even though it is not. Consumers may become initially in-
terested in this florist, assuming that it is somehow sponsored or
affiliated with Florist Transworld Delivery Company. As such, FTD
may have a valid false designation of origin claim against the search
engine that keyed this hammer ad to its trademark.
3. Dilution
Dilution is a cause of action reserved for only those marks that
qualify as "famous" under the Lanham Act. 227 As such, not all banner
ads keyed to a trademark will give rise to a dilution claim. On the
other hand, the fact that a famous mark is keyed to a banner ad for a
227 See supra Para 111(D).
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non-competitive or unrelated product will not defeat a claim of dilu-
tion. This is due to the fact that a plaintiff does not need to show that
customers are likely to be confused by the defendant's use of its
trademark.228
For example, the third ad encountered by our shopper was for a
jewelry shop. An argument could be made that such a banner ad is
unlikely to cause initial consumer confusion because a consumer
looking for flowers is unlikely to suddenly become interested in pur-
chasing diamonds instead. As "FTD" is a famous mark, however, such
an advertisement could lessen the capacity of the "FTD" mask to iden-
tify and distinguish its goods and services. Additionally, if "Suzanne's
House of Diamonds" sold low-quality gems, Florist Transworld Deliv-
ery may have a claim against the search engine for dilution by tar-
nishment for keying its mark to products of poor quality such that the
positive associations and the distinctive quality of the "FTD" mark are
degraded. It would also appear that any dilution that was the result of
a keyed banner ad would be deemed willful, since it is clear that the
search engine owner's intent was to trade on the trademark owner's
reputation.
CONCLUSION
Although at the time of this writing there has been only one judi-
cial decision involving banner ads keyed to trademarks, it will un-
doubtedly not be the last. As search engine operators continue to
make a healthy profit on this widespread practice, it is unlikely that
they will discontinue it anytime soon. Despite the decision in Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications, the keying of a banner ad-
vertisement to a trademark without the owner's permission is likely to
give rise to claims under the Lanham Act. In the meantime, however,
these electronic billboards will continue to be a predominate fixture
along the information superhighway.
228 See supra Part III(D).
